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I. INTRODUCTION
An important but insufficiently analyzed theme has run through
discussion of a number of the Obama administration's decisions at
the intersection of law and the effort to secure our nation against the
threat from al Qaeda and other violent extremists. The administra-
tion and others have argued that a variety of initiatives-such as
banning "enhanced interrogation techniques," closing the Guanta-
namo Bay detention facility, trying Khalid Sheihk Mohammed (KSM)
and other accused 9/11 plotters and al Qaeda members in federal
civilian courts, and the President's major address to the Muslim world
from Cairo in the summer of 2009 in which he underscored Ameri-
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ca's commitment to the rule of law'-will help restore our nation's
reputation abroad. The target audience has never been only the
leadership of other countries, however. Administration officials,
supporters,4 and critics5 have acknowledged that the opinion of the
world, broadly conceived, matters.
Does it? Should it? Is it wimpy and naive, or is it smart, to regard
improving foreign public opinion as a key factor in decisionmaking
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks on a New Beginning, Cairo University,
Cairo, Egypt (June 4, 2009) (transcript • available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-
University-6-04-09/) ("So America will defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of
nations and the rule of law.").
2. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut
Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html (quoting Dennis C.
Blair, Director of National Intelligence, who said Guantanamo has become "a
damaging symbol to the world" and "is a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment"); U.S.
Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks on the Closing of Guantanamo Bay, Berlin,
Germany (Apr. 29, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090429.html) (stating that
Guantanamo reflected Bush administration policies that "alienated our allies (and]
incited our adversaries," and use of the enemy combatant term "had become
needlessly inflammatory to our allies around the world").
3. At the one-year mark of her tenure as Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham
Clinton noted in remarks to State Department employees that " [w] e've broadened
our definition of diplomacy to extend beyond government-to-government engage-
ment, to include NGOs, the private sector, and citizens and media in nations across
the world." Chris Scott, Smart Power - 1 Year Later, ONE.ORG, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.one.org/blog/2010/01/27/smart-power-1-year-later.
4. See, e.g., Billy Corriher, Attorney General Is Correct to Insist on Civilian Trial for
Abdulmutailab, JURIST, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2010/02/attorney-general-is-correct-to-
insist._09.php ("Working within our criminal justice system to try terrorist suspects
ensures an American advantage in the struggle for hearts and minds.") ;Josh Gerstein,
No Good Options for President Obama in Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Trial POLITICO, Mar.
28, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/35101.html (quoting a
leading human rights lawyer who noted that" [c] losing Guantanamo while giving up
on all the substantive issues that it symbolizes really risks dissipating the goodwill,"
and that "[y]ou don't want a sense to set in around the world that Gitmo simply
moved from one location to another").
5. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Obama Administration is Tone-Deaf to Concerns About
Terrorism, WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/aricle/2010/2/1/AR2010020102854.html ("[W]hat is missing [from
the Obama administration's statements] is a firm recognition that what comes first is
not the message sent to America's critics but the message sent to Americans
themselves.... But more is at stake here than America's image abroad-namely the
security and peace of mind of Americans in America .... The Obama administration.
. . seems to have bent over backward to prove to the world it is not the Bush
administration and will, almost no matter what, ensure that everyone gets the benefit
of American civil liberties.").
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about national security or even a key policy purpose, including where
national security intersects with legal policy? What is the record to
date?
The idea of foreign sentiments mattering to national security is
not as radical, nor as simple, as it may sound. Foreign opinion has
been an intensive focus of statecraft for milennia.6 What is different
is that in our time revolutionary changes in the nature of power
globally have accorded unprecedented importance to foreign public
opinion, specifically foreign popular perceptions of U.S. policy. The
George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have both
understood this and have launched major efforts intended to improve
dramatically foreign public perception of the United States. The
Bush and Obama foreign public opinion strategies, although
significantly different, both transcend traditional public diplomacy.
They have also encountered similar challenges associated with
tensions between means and ends, the near and long terms, foreign
and domestic sentiment, and hope and fear. Foreign public opinion
is increasingly becoming a "normal" factor in national security
decisionmaking, and accordingly opinion dynamics need to be better
understood. Most importantly, at a time of unprecedented domestic
politicization of anti-terror policy, the U.S. political culture needs to
allow political space for discussion of foreign opinion as a legitimate
factor in decisionmaking about national security.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN OPINION
National security, at its core, means the protection of the na-
tion's safety and liberty in physical, political, and economic terms
And throughout the recorded history of statecraft, states have sought
to advance their security by using military, diplomatic, and economic
instruments of national power to influence the perceptions of foreign
military and political leaders and therefore their conduct.
Examples are legion, but several are illustrative. The ancient
Chinese general and father of what we call grand strategy, Sun Tzu,
6. My thoughts here are limited to consideration of foreign opinion in
decisionmaking by the political branches of the federal government. This essay does
not bear on the debate about -whether American courts should consider foreign
opinion-legal or popular.
7. I share the view ofJudgeJames E. Baker, that national security means both
protection of the nation from attack and protection of our free society as a free
society under the rule of law. SeeJAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL
SECURrnY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 20-22 (2007).
2010] 5225
3
Rudesill: Foreign Public Opinion and National Security
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
advised that the able military strategist directs their forces, employs
deception, and otherwise shapes the adversary's thinking in such a
way that one can win decisively-ideally, without having to fight at all.
At the start of the Peloponnesian War that devastated ancient Greece,
Corinthian and Athenian emissaries presented to the Spartan
Assembly the cases for and against SPartan intervention on the side of
Corinth in its dispute with Athens. The ancient Romans, for their
part, never had enough soldiers to protect all of their vast borders all
of the time. Instead, they invested huge sums of money, energy, and
time in a combination of fast roads, unmatched legions, expanding
fortifications, and persistent diplomacy to convince Persian princes
and barbarian tribes alike that fighting Rome would fail strategically.
If a warlord started to look wobbly, before the Empire drew the sword,
Rome routinely offered trade and cash payments to change minds
beyond the Empire's frontier. Many centuries later, Sun Tzu, the
Greeks, and Romans would have understood what the great German
strategist Carl von Clausewitz was getting at when he famously wrote
that war's true aim is influencing the adversary's decisionmaking
about whether to continue a contest of arms that is ultimately the
continuation of politics by other means.'1
This business of suasion---dissuasion and persuasion-took on
existential importance with the advent of the Cold War and the
possibility of nuclear war. Throughout the four-decade superpower
standoff, Washington and Moscow relentlessly improved and deftly
wielded their nuclear, conventional military, and diplomatic capabili-
ties to produce the condition of deterrence: dissuasion of attack on
one's interests by means of communicating to the adversary's
leadership one's capability and willingness to inflict losses the
adversary would find unacceptable relative to the anticipated gain.
Meanwhile, through arms sales, diplomatic engagement, and
economic aid, the United States and Soviet Union competed for the
support of leaders throughout the developing world and for the
8. SeeSuN Tzu, THEART OFWAR 77, 79 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1963) ("To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill....
[Allowing the able general to] take All-under-Heaven intact.").
9. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 1.68-1.78, at 73-82 (Rex
Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972); see also DONALD KAGAN, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
42-43 (2003).
10. CARLVONCLAUSEWlTZ, ON WAR 69, 75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832) (stating that "war is nothing but the continuation
of policy by other means," and military force is but one "instrument of policy"
available "to compel our enemy to do our will" in service of political objectives).
[Vol. 36:55226
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resulting perceived advantage in the zero-sum superpower contest.
To be sure, from antiquity through the Cold War, popular senti-
ment was far from geopolitically irrelevant. Insurrections bedeviled
Roman efforts to subdueJudea and Mesopotamia in the first centuries
C.E., nationalist sentiment facilitated unification of Germany and Italy
in the nineteenth century, and notions of self-determination helped
inspire the third world national liberation movements of the twen-
tieth century. During the late Cold War, popular opposition to
repressive communist rule-encouraged by Radio Free Europe and
other American public diplomacy efforts-hastened the fall of the
Berlin Wall. But far more important as determinants and targets of
statecraft were the perceptions of the elites who, by controlling the
levers of power, exercised effective monopolies on high-intensity
violence and diplomacy on the world stage.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION
Taking this long view of history allows us to appreciate that what
is revolutionary about our age is not that foreign opinion is important
to national security, but rather the unprecedented importance of the
opinions of foreign publics. This is a sea change in the nature of
geopolitical power, driven by globalization: the integration, expan-
sion, and acceleration of flows of ideas and information, goods and
services, and people worldwide thanks to the information technology
revolution, falling trade barriers, and the post-Cold War global wave
of political liberalization. Together, these trends have given relatively
average individuals and groups of them-whether beneficiaries or
rejectionists of globalization's integrating force-unprecedented
knowledge of America's leadership position, belief that their
opinions are important, and ability to organize and act on those
beliefs. Two resulting realities have made the opinions-and
therefore winning the consent 2 -of two foreign publics particularly
important to U.S. national security.
First, gone are the days when foreign states were billiard ball-like
11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., makes a similar point: "[information is power, and
modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever
before in history." JOSEPH S. NYE,JR., SoEr PowER: THE ME Ns TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 1 (2004).
12. For two thoughtful discussions of the importance of consent to U.S. grand
strategy, see PHILIP BOBBITr, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT
CENTURY (2008) and JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 117 (2004) ("[Y]ou can't sustain hegemony without consent.").
2010] 5227
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unitary actors under the direction of their elites. In the eighteenth
century, Louis XIV may have been essentially right in geopolitical
terms when he asserted "I am the state."' i3 At the end of the nine-
teenth century, political power remained concentrated in national
capitals dominated by relatively stable elites, and where democracy
existed at a minimum half the population usually lacked the right to
vote.1 But by the end of the twentieth century, all of America's major
allies had become dynamic democracies, led by a regularly changing
cast of leaders hired and fired by universal suffrage electorates with
unprecedented access to information about world affairs and the
ability to make their views known. Today, even leaders of quasi-
democracies like Russia and non-democracies like China must heed
domestic public opinion to an extent totalitarian rulers in Moscow or
Beijing half a century ago would not recognize. 15
Because political power worldwide is migrating to the people,
and because in our interdependent globalized world the United
States cannot meet its security needs without the consent (from
cooperation to acquiescence) of foreign governments, in the twenty-
first century America has a strategic interest in generating consent for
U.S. policies and leadership among the citizenry of our allies and
other key states. That is a complex and uncertain task, to be sure.
But the silver lining is that globalization has matched our national
security interest in favorable opinion of the United States abroad with
unprecedented ability to influence foreign popular sentiment via the
24/7 global communications system and its incessant focus on
American words and deeds.
A second key dynamic of our globalized world is that, along with
political power, the ability to create mass destruction (or at least mass
disruption) is devolving to non-state actors. The 9/11 attacks
demonstrated that relatively small social networks of globalization
13. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 312 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed.
1980) ("L'6tat c'est moi.").
14. SeeJohn Lewis Gaddis, Grand Strategy in the Second Term, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan.-
Feb. 2005, at 14.
15. For example, Chinese public opinion regarding Taiwan is acknowledged by
leading scholars as a driver of China's military buildup. One author writes that it is
common perception in China that "if the Communist regime allows Taiwan to
declare formal independence without putting up a fight, the outraged public will
bring down the regime." SuSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 2 (2007).
16. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., memorably termed it the "paradox of American power"
that our nation is the world's most powerful, but we cannot be secure if we fail to
work effectively with other states. See genera//yJOSEPH S. NYE,JR., THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN POWER: WHYTHE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE (2002).
5228 [Vol. 36:5
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rejectionists can leverage information technology, transportation
systems, and a handful of savvy, civilian-looking operatives to inflict
casualties on open societies at a level formerly reserved to states. The
Cold War's age of superpowers has been followed by the era of what
columnist Thomas Friedman terms the "super-empowered individu-
al." 17 Al Qaeda's super-empowered individuals are particularly deadly
because they are suicidal religious fanatics and therefore not deterra-
ble, because they move among and target civilians, and because
scientific advances and porous borders hold out real risk of their
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
In its report, the 9/11 Commission correctly recommended a
"broad political-military strategy" to counter the threat of al Qaeda
and its associates, one of attacking terrorists and their organizations,
protecting against the attacks they do launch, and preventing the
continued growth of Islamic terrorism by engaging in the "struggle of
ideas." 18 We can lose the war by failing at any of the three tasks
identified by the Commission, but it can only be won in the court of
Islamic public opinion, in the hearts and minds of the relatively
average Muslims at risk of becoming terrorists or supporting them.
We cannot win on offense, by capturing or killing every terrorist or
somehow coercing Muslims not to become terrorists. Defensive
homeland security efforts will not remove the threat to our allies and
interests abroad, and cannot be expected always to succeed at home.
True victory requires "draining the swamp"--improving Muslim
public opinion such that Muslims worldwide stop becoming or
supporting terrorists in sufficient numbers to threaten seriously our
country, interests, and allies. In other words, our ultimate objective is
to win the consent of the Muslim community, writ large, to the end of
what the last administration called the Global War on Terror.
Returning again to the long view of history, it is unreasonable to
think that enduring availability of WMD and seething anger at the
United States among a small but motivated minority of Muslims are
realities that can co-exist over decades without an unacceptable risk of
another horrific attack on the United States. To their credit, the Bush
and the Obama administrations have grasped this and have combined
aggressive non-proliferation efforts with renewed emphasis on public
diplomacy focused on Muslims abroad.
17. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, LONGITUDES AND ATTHTUDES: EXPLORING THE WORLD
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 6 (2002).
18. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERJ.ORISTATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/1 1 COMMISSION
REPORT 363, 365-98 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION].
2010] 5229
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Traditionally, public diplomacy has involved publicizing, explain-
ing, and arguing for U.S. policy, values, and leadership, via use of
official and unofficial media and personal engagement. Unlike
government-to-government diplomatic activities, public diplomacy has
focused on the individuals and groups (formal and informal) that
make up "foreign publics." After the end of the Cold War, public
diplomacy suffered significant reductions in prominence, budget,
personnel, and bureaucratic autonomy (due in part to merger of the
U.S. Information Agency into the State Department). In the wake of
the 9/11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission and the Independent Task
Force on Public Diplomacy, sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) and led by former Treasury Secretary Peter G.
Peterson, called for revitalized emphasis on public diplomacy and
recognition that U.S. image and policy are no longer different.' 9
Notably, Peterson suggested that policymakers should be willing to
adjust notjust the packaging of policy but in some cases its content.
2 0
What is remarkable about the Bush and Obama administrations
is that they have placed increased emphasis on public diplomacy and
gone well beyond, making dramatic change in Muslim popular
sentiment not a packaging or tailoring consideration but a prime
objective of major presidential initiatives. Though the Obama adminis-
tration is still young, it is fair to say that both administrations have
made improving foreign popular opinion of the United States a
strategic priority. Their initiatives have differed greatly, yet both
administrations have grappled with fundamentally similar challenges.
IV. BUSH: A "FORWARD STRATEGY OF FREEDOM"
Numerous rationales for the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq
were offered by the Bush administration, its supporters, and critics.
Of these, the most idealistic was that it was execution of a grand
strategy focused on democratization, a "forward strategy of free-
dom."' What historian John Lewis Gaddis rightly termed "the most
19. See id. at 376 ("American foreign policy is part of the message."); PETER G.
PETERSON ET AL., THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FINDING AMERICA'S VOICE: A
STRATEGY FOR REINVIGORATING U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 5 (2003); Peter G. Peterson,
Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 74, 75
("[T]he country must come to understand and accept the basic notion that 'image
problems' and 'foreign policy' are not things apart.").
20. See Peterson, Public Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 75 ("[T] he United States will
need to modify not simply the implementation of its foreign policies but, in certain
cases, the foreign policies themselves.").
21. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a "Forward
[Vol. 36:55230
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sweeping redesign of U.S. grand strategy since the presidency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt 2 2 was founded upon a new post-9/l1 under-
standing of Muslim public opinion as the strategic center of gravity in
the War on Terror. 3 The argument went like this: repressive states
had bred frustration and anger among average Muslims; Islam and
anti-Americanism had been used strategically by those states (many of
which had been supported by the United States during the Cold War
as bulwarks against Soviet influence) to focus public attention away
from their foul governance; al Qaeda had leveraged that frustration, a
multi-generational fundamentalist trend, and anti-Americanism into a
hateful popular movement that in the age of globalization and WMD
had to be abated; replacing Saddam Hussein with a democratic
government in Iraq would both remove the (wrongly presumed)
primary potential source of WMD for terrorists and create an example
of a self-governing open society that would spread throughout the
Arab and Muslim worlds and drain the cauldron of Muslim frustration
that sustained al Qaeda; and finally, starting the democratic dominoes
falling with military force (unilateral if necessary) was both necessary
and expedient.24 Or, as Bush eloquently put it in his second inaugural
address:
We have seen our vulnerability-and we have seen its deep-
est source. For as long as whole regions of the world simmer
in resentment and tyranny-prone to ideologies that feed
hatred and excuse murder-violence will gather, and mul-
tiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended bor-
ders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one force of
history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment,
and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes
of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human
freedom. We are led, by events and common sense, to one
conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly
Strategy of Freedom" to Promote Democracy in the Middle East (Nov. 6, 2003),
available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-11.html; see also THE
NATIONAL SECURrIYSTRATEGYOF THE UNITED STATES OFAMERIcA, at ii (2006), available
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2OO 6 .pdf.
22. Gaddis, supra note 14, at 2.
23. Condoleezza Rice, Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New
World, FOREIGNAFF.,Jul.-Aug. 2008, at 2, 16 ("[Tlhe fight against terrorism is a kind
of global counterinsurgency: the center of gravity is not the enemies we fight but the
societies they are trying to radicalize.").
24. For related discussion, see Gaddis, supra note 14, at 12-13.
2010] 5231
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depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best
hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in
all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest be-
liefs are now one.25
Acknowledging that consent of Muslims is integral to this strategy
and that legal norms are integral to just, open societies, the President
observed that "[fireedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and
defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the
protection of minorities. 26
Four years after Bush's stirring second inaugural, his administra-
tion left office with global popular opinion of the United States
generally-and specifically among allied states and Muslims-having
fallen far lower than when it entered, and dramatically lower than the
immediate post-9/ll period.27  What happened? A complete
explanation is beyond the scope of this article. But we can identify as
major contributing factors several tensions inherent in national
security policy efforts to improve foreign public opinion, ones the
Bush administration did not effectively address.
One is that means canfight ends. It is one thing-and an impor-
tant thing-to enhance public diplomacy. It is quite another thing to
launch a war with dramatic change to foreign public opinion as one
of its primary rationales. In that case, we have crossed from messag-
ing into grand strategy, and that requires aligning large means and
large ends. For the Bush administration, its method of getting the
democratic dominoes falling across the Middle East was an enormous
gamble that polls show dramatically hurt perceptions of the United
States abroad.28 As Gaddis observed, the Bush team miscalculated the
psychological effect of the war. Saddam's removal "humiliated at least
as many Arabs as it pleased." The looting and anarchy that ensued
on America's watch left many Muslims with the impression that the
United States did not really care about them, after all-and left Bush




27. See, e.g., Peter Katzenstein & Jeffrey Legro, Think Again: America's Image,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Oct. 5, 2009,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2O09/1O/05/think againanericasjimage.
28. "From nearly universal sympathy in the weeks after September 11, Americans
within a year and a half found their country widely regarded as an international
pariah." Gaddis, supra note 14, at 6.
29. Id. at 10.
5232 [Vol. 36:5
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with an unattractive choice between further worsening Muslim
opinion of America by abandoning Iraq to chaos and civil war, or
defying local popular opposition to the U.S. presence and extending
and expanding the U.S. deployment to keep order.
The failure to secure Iraq after the invasion was due in part to
lack of sufficient troops, and that stemmed in large part from the lack
of support from longstanding U.S. allies-a reality evident when the
Bush administration went to war despite objections from France,
Germany, and other allies, and consequently without explicit legal
authorization of force by the U.N. Security Council. A host of reasons
for opposition in allied capitals can be identified. Yet many-from
the Bush administration's rhetorical emphasis on unilateralism dating
to its first days in office, to its categorical rejection of the Kyoto
climate treaty and other key elements of the diplomatic agenda of
U.S. allies in early 2001, to the Bush administration's bewildering
rejection of offers by NATO allies of help in Afghanistan immediately
after 9/1130 and Manichean with-us-or-against-us rhetoric-have '
common root in apparent lack of understanding by the Bush team of
America's strategic interest in favorable opinion among the popula-
tions of U.S. allies. Ironically, the Bush administration so thoroughly
internalized the importance of Muslim public opinion that it
redesigned U.S. grand strategy around bringing democracy to the
Middle East, yet did not seem aware that popular disapproval of the
United States in existing allied democracies might be reflected in the
behavior of their elected leaders. The failure of the parliament of
NATO ally Turkey to approve the transit of American ground forces
through that country to invade Iraq from the north similarly reflected
popular opposition to American policy in an existing Muslim
democracy. Ultimately, the alienating way in which the Bush
administration went to war in Iraq at least in the near term has
prevented that means of advancing the "forward strategy of freedom"
from serving its strategic end.
Supporters of the Bush administration could be expected to ar-
gue that its rhetorical emphasis on unilateralism and rejection of the
Kyoto Accord and other globally popular initiatives reflected an
agenda that the American electoral system had endorsed in the
contested 2000 election. To the extent that is true, it points up a
second key tension that afflicts policy intended to improve percep-
tions of the United States abroad: domestic opinion versusJforeign opinion.
30. See id. at 5-6.
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Ambassador Christopher Ross, special coordinator for public
diplomacy at the State Department in the Bush administration,
observed that thanks to satellite TV and the Internet "all public
messages can, and will, reach multiple publics." 31 The same can be
said of policies. One could also add that, to whatever extent the Bush
administration's heavy message emphasis on war was intended for
domestic consumption, it pitted its domestic political interests against
the U.S. foreign policy interest in combating the widespread percep-
tion among Muslims abroad that-as al Qaeda alleges-America is at
war with Islam.
Those sympathetic with Bush's rejection of much of the interna-
tional community's agenda in 2001 and martial rhetoric post-9/11
might object that these were necessary steps, and that some number
of otherwise unrelated U.S. Government activities will always be in
tension with foreign public opinion improvement efforts. The latter
is true as a general proposition, and another way of saying that part of
governing is setting and coordinating priorities. A more salient point
with particular resonance regarding global opinion improvement
efforts is that there is tension between the near and long term, between
expediency and overarching policy goals.
It is a reality of globalization that western notions of the rule of
law, democracy, and human rights have gone global. United States
efforts to improve America's standing therefore naturally emphasize
America's association with law and justice values. But a values-based
campaign that targets foreign sentiment-whether via traditional
public diplomacy or via regime change by military force-is inevitably
a long-term project, one easily frustrated by the sheer volume and
pace of the 24/7 news cycle and its relentless search for sensational
images and the new hot issue of the day. 2 Expedient actions that
suggest hypocrisy when set against that values campaign become
instantly attractive and enduringly damaging stories.
The Bush administration's effort to improve Muslim opinion of
the United States in the years and decades to come was undermined
by coverage of the extra-judicial detention of several hundred Muslim
terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay and by revelation of the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques on Muslim detainees at "black
sites." 33 Against intense criticism at home and abroad on legal, policy,
31. Christopher Ross, Pillars ofPublic Diplomacy: Grapplingwith International Public
Opinion, 25 HARV. INT'L REV. 22, 24 (Summer 2003).
32. Ross makes a similar point. See id. at 27.
33. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, has described Guantana-
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and moral grounds, Bush argued to "our people, and the world" that
these were lawful, necessary, and limited steps to incapacitate
hardened terrorists and gather critical intelligence to prevent further
attacks.' Coming, as the Guantanamo and torture debates did, in the
years following the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (which the Bush
administration condemned) only made it harder for the Bush team to
argue that its agenda was actually intended to promote human rights,
expand the rule of law, and benefit Muslims.35
Infusing each of these tensions-means versus ends, foreign ver-
sus domestic opinion, and the near term versus the long-is a fourth
we can call the fearfactor. It is easier to scare than to inspire, especially
for a state whose enormous power will tend to cause anxiety and
resentment, and particularly when that powerful state is at war.
Alexander Hamilton was thinking of this aspect of the human psyche
when he observed that "Safety from external danger is the most
powerful director of national conduct., 36 He may not have been
surprised to observe that, within a few years of the advent of the
Global War on Terror, majorities of Muslims abroad and the electo-
rates of traditional allies regarded not al Qaeda but the United States
as a threat to world peace. As Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of
State in Bush's first term, commented to the 9/11 Commission, the
United States was "exporting our fears and our anger" far better than
its positive vision for the world.3
If the Iraq adventure ultimately produces the dramatic improve-
ment in Muslim popular opinion and falling democratic dominoes
envisioned by the Bush grand strategy, history may give less credit to
the Bush administration's management of the tensions discussed
mo as an asset to terrorist recruiters. See Mazzetti & Glaberson, supra note 2.
34. See Press Release, White House, President Discusses Creation of Military
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-
3.html. For an example of contemporary coverage, see Bush Admits to CIA Secret
Prisons, BBC NEws, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm.
35. For Bush's condemnation of the Abu Ghraib abuses and emphasis on the
benevolent intent of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, see Press Release, White House,
Global Message from President Bush's Interviews with Al Arabiya and Alhurra (May 6,
2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-1.html.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45 (Alexander Hamilton).
37. See PEw GLOBAL ATITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA'S IMAGE SLIPS, BUTALLIES SHARE
U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN, HAMAS (June 13, 2006),
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf.
38. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 377.
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here, and more to the American military and its response to the
central importance of Muslim public opinion. After his party lost
control of Congress in 2006-in significant measure because of
domestic displeasure with the course of the Iraq war-and the
bipartisan Iraq Study Group recommended a major reduction in
American involvement in Iraq, Bush made the largest course
correction of his tenure in the form of a "surge" of troops to Iraq and
embrace of the revised counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine devel-
40oped by General David Petraeus. Implementation of the COIN
strategy in Iraq during Petraeus's tenure as four-star Combatant
Commander of the U.S. Central Command has seen success few
expected, and a modified version is now being applied in Afghanis-
tan.
41
The COIN doctrine proceeds from the basic principle that at the
strategic level war has political rather than purely military aims, and
achieving those aims is a matter of changing opinions. In a COIN
campaign, both the perceptions of the insurgent adversary and the
populace on which it depends for recruits and support are in play.
The key to victory lies in providing security and development and
thereby winning popular hearts and minds better than the insurgents.
The current commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal,
described his COIN campaign as "not a physical war in terms of how
many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many
bridges you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants.,
42
V. OBAMA: "LIVING OUR VALUES"
In the effort to win the hearts and minds of foreign Muslim and
allied publics, Barack Obama's identity is itself an historic asset: as a
minority American of a black Kenyan father and a white Kansan
mother, raised in part in Muslim-majority Indonesia, he can credibly
39. JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GRouP REPORT, at xi (2006).
40. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24: COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006).
41. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Way Forward in Afghanistan
and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009) (transcript available at http://wwwwhitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan)
(emphasizing that additional U.S. troops will not only attack the enemy but also
secure the population and be supplemented by civilian efforts).
42. See Thom Shanker, Top U.S. Commander Sees Progress in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A1O. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Michael Mullen, similarly observed that "the battlefield isn't necessarily a field
anymore. It's in the minds of the people." Thom Shanker, Joint Chiefs Chairman
Readjusts Principles on Use of Force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A16.
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speak not just as an American but as a global citizen. Although the
Obama administration is just over a year old and as of this writing has
not yet released its national security strategy, its statements and
actions to date suggest a focused strategy that recognizes globaliza-
tion's elevation of the importance of the opinion of foreign publics-
and particularly Muslim and allied publics-in national security.
43
Official statements and media coverage of the Obama campaign
and administration to date suggest a five-part strategy, one that
focuses to an unprecedented degree on public diplomacy, combined
with several legal policy changes.
One element was reflected in then-candidate Obama's address to
the people of Berlin in July 2008 as "a fellow citizen of the world"
concerned about "the view that America is part of what has gone
wrong in our world, rather than a force to help make it right":
personal presidential outreach to global opinion generally and
reaffirmation of American commitment to cooperation and universal
values." Obama's inaugural address was addressed not only to
Americans but "to all the other peoples and governments who are
watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where
my father was born"--average residents of the planet who may "know
that America is a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and
child who seeks a future of peace and dignity.45 The State Depart-
ment under Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton has meanwhile
"broadened our definition of diplomacy to extend beyond govern-
ment-to-government engagement, to include NGOs, the private
sector, and citizens and media in nations across the world.,
46
Second, the new administration has undertaken high-profile out-
reach particularly to Muslims, in what President Obama in his May
2009 National Archives speech described as "an era when an extremist
ideology threatens our people, and technology gives a handful of
terrorists the potential to do us great harm. To combat the
43. For an example of widespread recognition of this as a major focus of the
Obama administration, see Scott Shane, American's Arrest StirsFears that WarsRadicalize
U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, atA4 ("President Obama took office last year
determined to combat the notion that the United States is hostile to Islam.").
44. Barack Obama, A World that Stands As One, Berlin, Germany (July 24,2008)
(transcript available at http://www.observer.com/2008/arts-culture/obamas-berlin-
speech).
45. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address).
46. See Scott, supra note 3.
47. President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2009) (transcript available at
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erroneous perception that the United States is at war with Islam, the
administration has dropped the term "Global War on Terror." And
in a major speech to the Muslim world in summer 2009 he began with
the Islamic greeting al-salamu alaykum Obama explained that
I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between
the United States and Muslims around the world, one based
on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon
the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need
not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share
common principles-principles of justice and progress;
tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.4
Obama also taped two annual video messages addressed to the
people of Iran during the annual celebration of the holiday Nowruz,
extending an offer of dialogue regarding Iran's nuclear program and
emphasizing shared values.49 Whether or not Obama's outreach to
Iranian citizens pays dividends in changed policy in Tehran, there is
no question that the new administration has succeeded in changing
the focus and tone of presidential statements. In today's changed
geopolitical environment, that is no small matter.
A third evident thrust appears targeted at both allied and Muslim
foreign constituencies: emphasis on "living our values" as "our best
national security asset, '50 and attendant legal-related policy moves.
Obama in his inaugural address pledged that the United States will
"reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals," 51 and
four months later at the National Archives he emphasized that "I
believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we also
cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most
fundamental values. ' 52 Accordingly, the President issued executive
orders to close within a year the Guantanamo Bay detention facility
and ban Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs),53 which
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-presoffice/Remarks-by-the-President-n-National-
Security-5-21-09).
48. Obama Cairo Speech, supra note 1. During the campaign Obama pledged to
make such a major speech in a Muslim nation early in his presidency.
49. See President Barack Obama, Message to the Iranian People (Mar. 19, 2009)
(video message available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-Presidents-
Message-to-the-Iranian-People); President Barack Obama, Nowruz Message (Mar. 20,
2010) (video message available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/19/president-obamas-nowruz-message).
50. Obama Archives Speech, supra note 47.
51. Obama Inaugural Address, supra note 45.
52. Obama Archives Speech, supra note 47.
53. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22,2009); Exec. Order No.
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Obama stated "serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists, and increase
the will of our enemies to fight us, while decreasing the will of others
to work with America.""' In the interest of transparency and accoun-
tability, the administration also pledged to release documents from
the Bush years concerning detainee abuse. 5 Additionally, thejustice
Department announced it would prosecute KSM and other accused
9/11 conspirators in civilian federal court in New York City rather
56
than before military commissions.
These moves have been defended on a number of grounds and
no doubt are believed by the administration to be in the interest of
justice, whatever their other merits. But we cannot but note the
President's explicit linking of values and national security, and that
each of these moves are well within the realm of discretionary legal
policy. With the arguable exception of the EITs ban, none of these
decisions were required as a matter of law. All could reasonably be
expected to improve regard for the United States among foreign
Muslim and allied publics. And, regarding KSM and the other 9/11
defendants, the prosecutorial decision is, in the words of the United
States Attorneys' Manual, "a policy judgment [about] the fundamental
interests of society.,5 7 Provided that the Government has probable
cause that a crime has been committed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that enforcement priorities are a legitimate factor in
charging decisions and that courts should generally avoid questioning
motives. 8
A fourth element of the Obama administration's apparent strate-
13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009). Obama also noted these moves in his
Cairo speech. Obama Cairo Speech, supra note 1.
54. Obarna Archives Speech, supra note 47.
55. Press Release, White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on
Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press office/statement-of-president-barack-obama-
on-release-of-olc-memos/.
56. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Announces Forum
Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech- 09 1113.html.
57. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, UNITED STATEsATroRNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.001 (1997).
Grounds for commencing prosecution include federal interest and the viability of
prosecution in anotherjurisdiction. Id. § 9-27.220(A). Whether "substantial federal
interest!' would be served by prosecution depends on "federal law enforcement
priorities" set by the Justice Department and the "nature and seriousness of the
offense," a factor which properly embraces the "potential impact of the offense on
the community" and "what the public attitude is toward prosecution under the
circumstances of the case." Id. § 9-27.230(A), (B) (2).
58. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
52392010]
17
Rudesill: Foreign Public Opinion and National Security
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
gy is accelerated drawdown of the internationally unpopular Iraq
deployment. Meanwhile, the administration has refocused military
efforts on reversing the Taliban's resurgence and securing Afghanis-
tan. As with the legal policy decisions, one can take at face value the
Obama administration's belief that these moves are by their own
merits right, while noting that they are consistent with a broad
strategy to improve foreign popular perception of the United States.
The same may be said of administration moves on climate change,
nuclear threats, and other prominent global issues.
Finally, the administration has sought to reduce the relative em-
phasis on military or "hard power" in U.S. foreign policy and
maximize the utility of other "soft power"-enhancing instruments of
national power, particularly diplomacy and development aid.59 In this
effort the Obama administration has found a strong ally in its first and
President Bush's last Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, who in 2007
explained that "smart power" integration of military and non-military
efforts is necessary because "military success is not sufficient to win!"in
Iraq and Afghanistan. 6° "[E]conomic development, institution-
building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good
governance, providing basic services to the people, training and
equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communi-
cations, and more-these, along with security, are essential ingre-
dients for long-term success. 61
In short, the Obama agenda is broadly responsive to the call of
the 9/11 Commission for a consent-building initiative that will "offer
an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat
people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and
caring to our neighbors."62
After the sharp declines in America's standing during the Bush
years, opinion of the United States improved dramatically among
foreign publics after Obama's election. This "Obama effect" has
faded over time, however, a trend to which each of the overarching
59. Joseph S. Nye,Jr., coined the phrase "soft power" and defines it as the ability
to make others "want what we want." See NYE, SoFr POWER, supra note 11, at 2.
60. Robert M. Gates, Sec'y of Def., Landon Lecture at Kan. State Univ.,
Manhattan, Kans. (Nov. 26, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199). Earlier that month,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released an influential
report on the subject of "smart power." See RIcHARD L. ARMrrAGE &JOSEPH S. NYE,JR.,
CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART PoWER: A SMARTER, MORE SECURE AMERICA (2007).
61. Gates, supra note 60.
62. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 376.
63. See Katzenstein & Legro, supra note 27.
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tensions in efforts to improve foreign popular opinion identified
above likely have contributed.
Despite the success of the COIN-based surge in Iraq and the Ob-
ama administration's acceleration of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq,
Obama in Afghanistan has inherited means-versus-ends tensions similar
to those that dogged Bush's grand strategy once the United States was
responsible for keeping order in Iraq. The Obama administration's
broad effort to improve foreign Muslim opinion would likely be
harmed if the security situation in Afghanistan were to worsen, but
military efforts-particularly the administration's deployment of
30,000 more troops-to protect the populace and defeat the resur-
gent Taliban are unpopular among Muslims, who hear constantly
from al Qaeda that Obama is no different from Bush.6 Meanwhile,
the new administration's need for additional troops from NATO
countries in which the Afghanistan war is unpopular creates friction
with its goal of improving perceptions of the United States among
allied electorates.
So far, the Obama administration has found these tensions more
manageable than did the Bush team. There is growing evidence that
al Qaeda's murder of so many non-combatants and Muslims may be
damaging its standing,r a welcome counter-balance to the potential
of the U.S. surge into Afghanistan to drive Muslims into our adversa-
ries' arms. And Obama has gotten additional pledges of troops from
allies.6
The most difficult strategic tension for the Obama administration
in its first fifteen months has been that between domestic and foreign
opinion. In Berlin last summer, Attorney General Holder explained
that "Guantanamo has come to represent a time and an approach
that we want to put behind us: a disregard for our centuries-long
64. See Shane, supra note 43.
65. See Fawaz A. Gerges, Al-Qaida Today: A Movement at the Crossroads,
OPENDEMOCRACY, May 14, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/al-qaida-
today-the-fate-of-a-movement (discussing polling data demonstrating a "loss of public
support for al-Qaida's wholesale attacks on civilians" and that "confidence in bin
Laden has fallen in most Muslim countries in recent years," but also noting that al
Qaeda "does appear to have strengthened its foothold along Pakistan's tribal border
with Afghanistan thanks to its connection with the Taliban in both countries").
66. SeeVanessa Mock, Obama's Nato Allies to Send 7,000 Trops, THE INDEPEN Tr,
Dec. 5, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/obamas-nato-
allies-to-send-7000-troops-1834629.html. But see Craig Whitlock, NATO Struggling to
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respect for the rule of law and a go-it alone approach that alienated
our allies, incited our adversaries and ultimately weakened our fight
against terrorism." 67 In various forms, this view has been widely held
among opinion leaders in Washington for several years. However, in
2009 opponents of closing Guantanamo and thejustice Department's
intent to try KSM and other accused 9/11 conspirators in federal
civilian court mobilized domestic sentiment against these legal policy
moves by alleging, inter alia, that they will increase the risk of another
attack inside the United States.6 Some critics have directly assailed
the foreign public opinion improvement rationale for these and other
moves. For example, one prominent columnist heatedly opined that
"what comes first is not the message sent to America's critics but the
message sent to Americans themselves.... [M] ore is at stake here
than America's image abroad-namely the security and peace of
mind of Americans in America." 69 Other critics have complained of
what they view as the apologetic nature of the President's speeches to
foreign audiences, in which the President has acknowledged that
America's track record has not always been perfect.7° To date,
Congress has denied funding to close Guantanamo,7 ' and the case for
considering foreign public opinion in U.S. policy has not yet been
made effectively.
Another controversy during Obama's first year-regarding re-
lease of photographs of detainees taken by U.S. personnel between
2002 and 2004 reportedly showing abuse-points up a third tension
also faced by the Bush administration: the tension between long term
policy objectives and near term necessities. The new administration
promised unprecedented transparency as part of its long-range effort
to restore faith at home and abroad in the commitment of the United
67. Holder, supra note 2.
68. For an example of media coverage, see Julian E. Barnes & Christi Parsons,
White House Reconsiders Holding Terror Tiials in Civilian Court L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,2010,
www.latimes.com/news/la-na-terror-trial6-2010mar06,0,7195116.story.
69. Cohen, supra note 5.
70. See, e.g., Nile Gardiner & Morgan Roach, The Heritage Foundation, Barack
Obama's Top 10 Apologies (2009),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/Barack-Obamas-Top-10-
Apologies-How-the-President-Has-Humiliated-a-Superpower (discussing ten
"apologies" by Obama when addressing a foreign audience).
71. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote 196, 111th Congress, 1st Session,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-ca lists/ro LcalLvote-cft.cfm?congres
s=l11l&session=l&vote=00196; David M. Herszenhorn, Funds to Close Guantanamo
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States to universal human values and the rule of law. Accordingly,
there was support among many in Washington to release the photos,
just as the administration had decided to release memos prepared by
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel on domestic use of
the military and other topics.7' As the President explained at the
National Archives in May 2009, however, the long-term interest was
over-ridden by a near-term foreign opinion risk: "releasing these
photos would inflame anti-American opinion" and endanger the
"nearly 200,000 Americans who are serving in harm's way."'73
When viewed together with domestic alarm about reported po-
tential relocation of Guantanamo detainees to super-maximum
security prisons in the United States for detention or to NewYork for
trial, the public debate about the detainee photos reminds us that the
fearfactor that frustrated the Bush administration's strategy abroad can
erode favorable domestic opinion, as well. No major presidential
initiative can succeed without domestic political support. The reality
that voters are more readily scared than inspired therefore can be
added to the long list of reasons why grand strategies generally do not
work-and never succeed without grand commitments of time,
energy, and political capital.
VI. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
The challenges faced by the Bush and Obama administrations in
operationalizing their strategies for improving foreign popular
perceptions of the United States have differed in their specifics, but in
their common underlying tensions suggest several prospective points.
First, on ends and means, developing favorable opinion of the
United States among foreign publics-and especially among Muslims
and allied state citizenries-is likely to stay with us as a major goal of
U.S. foreign policy. The democratization of high-intensity violence
and of political power discussed above is likely only to continue, and
neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations have yet seemed to
find a perfect policy response, much less a simple or easy one.
72. See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo, DeputyAssistantAtt'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to DanielJ. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs,
Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) to Military Detention of United States Citizens
(June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memodetentionuscitizens0 6 27 20 0 2.pdf.
73. Obama Archives speech, supra note 47. This long-term-versus-near-term,
policy-versus-practicality point also has resonance in the public discussion both here
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The urgency of the threat from al Qaeda's super-empowered
individuals and our enduring need for active cooperation from our
democratic allies suggests that administrations for the foreseeable
future will not only be continuing aggressive public diplomacy but will
be formulating what we can call "foreign public opinion policy."
They will be grappling with how to align policy ends and means, how
to weigh foreign popular sentiment effects against other interests. As
with any national security policy decision process, these tasks will be
intensely context-specific, will involve trade-offs and risk balancing,
and will require constant monitoring and reassessment as our
understanding of the fact patterns and foreign dynamics evolve. In
short, the U.S. policy community will come to understand foreign
public opinion as a normal, legitimate national security consideration
and focus, one that is sometimes of paramount importance, some-
times secondary, but often relevant and worthy of evaluation.
In view of the policy tension between domestic and foreign popular
opinion, we also need a public dialogue about the importance of
foreign public opinion to American national security, one that
ensures there is political space for elected leaders to consider global
opinion a legitimate decisionmaking factor or focus. Americans have
come to understand that it is not enough to have powerful offensive
military and defensive homeland security capabilities-we need to
work aggressively to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring
WMD. Americans also understand that it is not enough to have
domestic markets-we need them abroad, as well. Similarly, our
political culture needs to understand that it is not enough to consider
the perceptions of foreign leaders (friendly and unfriendly) regarding
our nation's reputation. It is also wise national security policy to
consider improving foreign public opinion as a factor in and even
objective of national security policy.
As part of this discussion, the nation could benefit from a rea-
soned dialogue about the appropriate role of foreign public opinion
in legal policy. Popular opinion abroad clearly matters to national
security policy, and national security is a legitimate factor in legal
policy decisions such as bringing criminal charges. 74 However, there
74. See U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, supra note 57, § 9-27.230(A)(1)-(2), (B) (1)-(2).
The "substantial federal interest" factor implicitly embraces national security. The
importance of national security, and the role of senior administration national
security officials, in the 9/11 charging decisions was the subject of an exchange
between SenatorJeff Sessions, Ranking Member of the SenateJudiciary Committee,
and Attorney General Eric Holder, at a recent Judiciary Committee hearing. See
Oversight of the US. Department ofJustice: Hearing of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111 th Cong.
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is natural skepticism generally even about domestic popular sentiment
influencing legal policy. Recognizing foreign public opinion as a
legitimate national security consideration in legal policy therefore
could benefit from some focused, sober thought and discussion.
On the long term versus the near, two closing points. One is that we
need to understand better foreign public opinion dynamics over the
long term. So many factors are in play, and the volume, diversity, and
speed of foreign opinion are so rapidly growing, that modeling the
potential impact of U.S. policy is a task that is only becoming more
complex and worthy of study.75
The second point is an uncomfortable but important truth: our
nation's leaders must be prepared to do things that are unpopular
abroad (and/or unpopular at home), even intensely unpopular over
the long run, if another national interest demands it in the near term
and the two interests cannot be reconciled. Employing nuclear
weapons, if necessary to protect a vital national interest, is but one
example. Even where the United States is not taking action that
squarely defies foreign public sentiment, a nation as affluent and
powerful as ours will inevitably engender resentment by those less
fortunate. It is therefore unrealistic to think that the United States
can be universally liked, much less loved, by everyone worldwide, no
matter how hard we try. The fear factor in politics and human
psychology makes this so.
However, it is realistic to develop strategies that align means and
ends, have sufficient domestic support, and balance long-term goals
with near-term necessities in a way that expand to Muslim nations like
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen the status quo in most other
countries today: that we are not so hated that average people in
significant numbers join or support terrorist organizations bent on
our destruction. It is also realistic to think we can expand the reach
of the status quo in many democratic states today: that the United
States is not so disliked that their leaders cannot cooperate with
America on major matters without risking electoral defeat. After
millennia in which states wielded military, diplomatic, and economic
instruments of national power to change the minds of foreign elites,
(Apr. 14 2010) (on file with author).
75. Among the many questions deserving of study, here is one" Is it significant
that the U.S. Government's relationship with foreign publics is not transactional in
the way that state-to-state diplomacy is transactional and leaves foreign diplomats with
a sense of having secured something from the United States? Might this be part of
the reason why after a few years Muslims generally did not seem to give the West
much credit for protecting a Muslim majority in the 1999 Kosovo war?
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the task of U.S. policymakers today is to foster consent for U.S.
leadership abroad more broadly. The experiences of the Bush and
Obama administrations teach that this is surely not an easy nor easily
understood task, but it is important and will be on every White House
agenda from here forward.
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PART IV: STUDENT NOTE
The Journal of the National Security Forum held a nationwide
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